E2P13S2
Scholium — Part II
Latin
His itaque videmus qua ratione individuum compositum possit multis modis affici, ejus nihilominus natura servata. Atque hucusque individuum concepimus quod non nisi ex corporibus quæ solo motu et quiete, celeritate et tarditate inter se distinguuntur hoc est quod ex corporibus simplicissimis componitur. Quod si jam aliud concipiamus ex pluribus diversæ naturæ individuis compositum, idem pluribus aliis modis posse affici reperiemus, ipsius nihilominus natura servata. Nam quandoquidem ejus unaquæque pars ex pluribus corporibus est composita, poterit ergo (per lemma præcedens) unaquæque pars absque ulla ipsius naturæ mutatione jam tardius jam celerius moveri et consequenter motus suos citius vel tardius reliquis communicare. Quod si præterea tertium individuorum genus ex his secundis compositum concipiamus, idem multis aliis modis affici posse reperiemus absque ulla ejus formæ mutatione. Et si sic porro in infinitum pergamus, facile concipiemus totam naturam unum esse Individuum cujus partes hoc est omnia corpora infinitis modis variant absque ulla totius Individui mutatione. Atque hæc, si animus fuisset de corpore ex professo agere, prolixius explicare et demonstrare debuissem. Sed jam dixi me aliud velle nec alia de causa hæc adferre quam quia ex ipsis ea quæ demonstrare constitui, facile possum deducere.
English (Elwes 1883)
We thus see, how a composite individual may be affected in many different ways, and preserve its nature notwithstanding. Thus far we have conceived an individual as composed of bodies only distinguished one from the other in respect of motion and rest, speed and slowness; that is, of bodies of the most simple character. If, however, we now conceive another individual composed of several individuals of diverse natures, we shall find that the number of ways in which it can be affected, without losing its nature, will be greatly multiplied. Each of its parts would consist of several bodies, and therefore (by Lemma vi.) each part would admit, without change to its nature, of quicker or slower motion, and would consequently be able to transmit its motions more quickly or more slowly to the remaining parts. If we further conceive a third kind of individuals composed of individuals of this second kind, we shall find that they may be affected in a still greater number of ways without changing their actuality. We may easily proceed thus to infinity, and conceive the whole of nature as one individual, whose parts, that is, all bodies, vary in infinite ways, without any change in the individual as a whole. I should feel bound to explain and demonstrate this point at more length, if I were writing a special treatise on body. But I have already said that such is not my object; I have only touched on the question, because it enables me to prove easily that which I have in view.
Modern English
We see from this, then, in what way a composite individual can be affected in many ways while its nature is still preserved. We have so far conceived of an individual composed only of bodies that are distinguished from one another by motion and rest, speed and slowness, that is, composed of the simplest bodies.
If we now conceive another individual composed of several individuals of diverse natures, we will find that it can be affected in many more ways while its nature is still preserved. For since each of its parts is itself composed of several bodies, each part can (by the preceding lemma) move more slowly or more quickly, without any change to its nature, and consequently communicate its motions to the rest more quickly or more slowly.
If we further conceive a third kind of individual, composed of individuals of this second kind, we will find that it can be affected in still more ways without any change to its form. And if we continue in this way to infinity, we easily conceive the whole of nature as one Individual, whose parts, that is, all bodies, vary in infinitely many ways without any change to the Individual as a whole.
I should have had to explain and demonstrate all this at greater length had I intended to treat of body expressly. But I have already said that I have a different aim, and that I raise these questions only because I can easily draw from them what I have set out to demonstrate.