E2P13S1
Scholium 1 to Proposition 13 — Part II
Latin
Ex his non tantum intelligimus mentem humanam unitam esse corpori sed etiam quid per mentis et corporis unionem intelligendum sit. Verum ipsam adæquate sive distincte intelligere nemo poterit nisi prius nostri corporis naturam adæquate cognoscat. Nam ea quæ hucusque ostendimus, admodum communia sunt nec magis ad homines quam ad reliqua individua pertinent, quæ omnia quamvis diversis gradibus animata tamen sunt. Nam cujuscunque rei datur necessario in Deo idea cujus Deus est causa eodem modo ac humani corporis ideæ atque adeo quicquid de idea humani corporis diximus, id de cujuscunque rei idea necessario dicendum est. Attamen nec etiam negare possumus ideas inter se ut ipsa objecta differre unamque alia præstantiorem esse plusque realitatis continere prout objectum unius objecto alterius præstantius est plusque realitatis continet ac propterea ad determinandum quid mens humana reliquis intersit quidque reliquis præstet, necesse nobis est ejus objecti ut diximus hoc est corporis humani naturam cognoscere. Eam autem hic explicare nec possum nec id ad ea quæ demonstrare volo, necesse est. Hoc tamen in genere dico quo corpus aliquod reliquis aptius est ad plura simul agendum vel patiendum, eo ejus mens reliquis aptior est ad plura simul percipiendum et quo unius corporis actiones magis ab ipso solo pendent et quo minus alia corpora cum eodem in agendo concurrunt, eo ejus mens aptior est ad distincte intelligendum. Atque ex his præstantiam unius mentis præ aliis cognoscere possumus, deinde causam etiam videre cur nostri corporis non nisi admodum confusam habeamus cognitionem et alia plura quæ in sequentibus ex his deducam. Qua de causa operæ pretium esse duxi hæc ipsa accuratius explicare et demonstrare, ad quod necesse est pauca de natura corporum præmittere.
English (Elwes 1883)
We thus comprehend, not only that the human mind is united to the body, but also the nature of the union between mind and body. However, no one will be able to grasp this adequately or distinctly, unless he first has adequate knowledge of the nature of our body. The propositions we have advanced hitherto have been entirely general, applying not more to men than to other individual things, all of which, though in different degrees, are animated.[3] For of everything there is necessarily an idea in God, of which God is the cause, in the same way as there is an idea of the human body; thus whatever we have asserted of the idea of the human body must necessarily also be asserted of the idea of everything else. Still, on the other hand, we cannot deny that ideas, like objects, differ one from the other, one being more excellent than another and containing more reality, just as the object of one idea is more excellent than the object of another idea, and contains more reality.
[3] "Animata"
Wherefore, in order to determine, wherein the human mind differs from other things, and wherein it surpasses them, it is necessary for us to know the nature of its object, that is, of the human body. What this nature is, I am not able here to explain, nor is it necessary for the proof of what I advance, that I should do so. I will only say generally, that in proportion as any given body is more fitted than others for doing many actions or receiving many impressions at once, so also is the mind, of which it is the object, more fitted than others for forming many simultaneous perceptions; and the more the actions of the body depend on itself alone, and the fewer other bodies concur with it in action, the more fitted is the mind of which it is the object for distinct comprehension. We may thus recognize the superiority of one mind over others, and may further see the cause, why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body, and also many kindred questions, which I will, in the following propositions, deduce from what has been advanced. Wherefore I have thought it worth while to explain and prove more strictly my present statements. In order to do so, I must premise a few propositions concerning the nature of bodies.
Modern English
From this we understand not only that the human mind is united to the body, but also what we are to understand by the union of mind and body. No one, however, will be able to grasp this adequately or distinctly unless they first have adequate knowledge of the nature of our body. The things we have shown so far are entirely general: they apply to people no more than to other individuals, all of which, though in different degrees, are nonetheless animate. For of each thing there is necessarily an idea in God of which God is the cause, in the same way as there is an idea of the human body, and so everything we have said of the idea of the human body must necessarily be said of the idea of any other thing.
Yet we cannot deny that ideas differ among themselves, just as their objects do, and that one is more excellent than another and contains more reality, in proportion as its object is more excellent and contains more reality. And so to determine how the human mind differs from others and surpasses them, we need to know the nature of its object, that is, the nature of the human body, as I said. I cannot explain that nature here, nor is it necessary for what I want to demonstrate.
This much I will say in general: the more a body is apt, compared to others, to act and be acted upon in many ways at once, the more its mind is apt to perceive many things at once. The more a body's actions depend on that body alone, and the fewer other bodies concur with it in acting, the more its mind is apt for distinct understanding. From this we can recognize the excellence of one mind above others, and also see the cause of our very confused knowledge of our own body — along with many other conclusions I will draw from these premises. For this reason I have thought it worthwhile to explain and demonstrate these matters more carefully, and to do so it is necessary to set out a few things concerning the nature of bodies first.