E2P10S2
Scholium — Part II
Latin
Omnes sane concedere debent nihil sine Deo esse neque concipi posse. Nam apud omnes in confesso est quod Deus omnium rerum tam earum essentiæ quam earum existentiæ unica est causa hoc est Deus non tantum est causa rerum secundum fieri ut aiunt sed etiam secundum esse. At interim plerique id ad essentiam alicujus rei pertinere dicunt sine quo res nec esse nec concipi potest adeoque vel naturam Dei ad essentiam rerum creatarum pertinere vel res creatas sine Deo vel esse vel concipi posse credunt vel quod certius est, sibi non satis constant. Cujus rei causam fuisse credo quod ordinem philosophandi non tenuerint. Nam naturam divinam quam ante omnia contemplari debebant quia tam cognitione quam natura prior est, ordine cognitionis ultimam et res quæ sensuum objecta vocantur, omnibus priores esse crediderunt; unde factum est ut dum res naturales contemplati sunt, de nulla re minus cogitaverint quam de divina natura et cum postea animum ad divinam naturam contemplandum appulerint, de nulla re minus cogitare potuerint quam de primis suis figmentis quibus rerum naturalium cognitionem superstruxerant; utpote quæ ad cognitionem divinæ naturæ nihil juvare poterant adeoque nihil mirum si sibi passim contradixerint. Sed hoc mitto. Nam meum intentum hic tantum fuit causam reddere cur non dixerim id ad essentiam alicujus rei pertinere sine quo res nec esse nec concipi potest; nimirum quia res singulares non possunt sine Deo esse nec concipi et tamen Deus ad earum essentiam non pertinet sed id necessario essentiam alicujus rei constituere dixi quo dato, res ponitur et quo sublato, res tollitur vel id sine quo res et vice versa id quod sine re nec esse nec concipi potest.
English (Elwes 1883)
Everyone must surely admit, that nothing can be or be conceived without God. All men agree that God is the one and only cause of all things, both of their essence and of their existence; that is, God is not only the cause of things in respect to their being made (secundum fieri), but also in respect to their being (secundum esse).
At the same time many assert, that that, without which a thing cannot be nor be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing; wherefore they believe that either the nature of God appertains to the essence of created things, or else that created things can be or be conceived without God; or else, as is more probably the case, they hold inconsistent doctrines. I think the cause for such confusion is mainly, that they do not keep to the proper order of philosophic thinking. The nature of God, which should be reflected on first, inasmuch as it is prior both in the order of knowledge and the order of nature, they have taken to be last in the order of knowledge, and have put into the first place what they call the objects of sensation; hence, while they are considering natural phenomena, they give no attention at all to the divine nature, and, when afterwards they apply their mind to the study of the divine nature, they are quite unable to bear in mind the first hypotheses, with which they have overlaid the knowledge of natural phenomena, inasmuch as such hypotheses are no help towards understanding the divine nature. So that it is hardly to be wondered at, that these persons contradict themselves freely.
However, I pass over this point. My intention her was only to give a reason for not saying, that that, without which a thing cannot be or be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing: individual things cannot be or be conceived without God, yet God does not appertain to their essence. I said that "I considered as belonging to the essence of a thing that, which being given, the thing is necessarily given also, and which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also; or that without which the thing, and which itself without the thing can neither be nor be conceived." (II. Def. ii.)
Modern English
Everyone must surely admit that nothing can exist or be conceived without God. All agree that God is the unique cause of all things, both of their essence and of their existence. That is, God is not only the cause of things with respect to their coming to be (secundum fieri, as they say), but also with respect to their being (secundum esse). Yet many then assert that what a thing can neither exist nor be conceived without belongs to that thing's essence, and so they end up either believing that the nature of God belongs to the essence of created things, or that created things can exist or be conceived without God, or — what is more likely — they hold inconsistent views.
The cause of this confusion, I believe, is that they have not kept to the proper order of philosophical thinking. For the divine nature, which they ought to have considered first, since it is prior in both knowledge and nature, they have placed last in the order of knowledge, while putting what they call the objects of the senses first. The result is that, while contemplating natural things, they have thought least of all about the divine nature; and then, when they turned their minds to contemplating the divine nature, they could not let go of the first fictions on which they had built their knowledge of natural things, fictions that are of no help in understanding the divine nature. Small wonder, then, that they contradicted themselves at every turn.
But I set this aside. My intention here was only to give a reason for not saying that what a thing can neither exist nor be conceived without belongs to that thing's essence. Singular things can neither exist nor be conceived without God, and yet God does not belong to their essence. What I said constitutes the essence of a thing necessarily is: that which, given, the thing is necessarily posited, and which, removed, the thing is necessarily removed, in other words, that without which the thing can neither exist nor be conceived, and which in turn can neither exist nor be conceived without the thing.