E1P32D
Demonstration — Part I
Latin
Voluntas certus tantum cogitandi modus est sicuti intellectus adeoque (per propositionem 28) unaquæque volitio non potest existere neque ad operandum determinari nisi ab alia causa determinetur et hæc rursus ab alia et sic porro in infinitum. Quod si voluntas infinita supponatur, debet etiam ad existendum et operandum determinari a Deo, non quatenus substantia absolute infinita est sed quatenus attributum habet quod infinitam et æternam cogitationis essentiam exprimit (per propositionem 23). Quocunque igitur modo sive finita sive infinita concipiatur, causam requirit a qua ad existendum et operandum determinetur adeoque (per definitionem 7) non potest dici causa libera sed tantum necessaria vel coacta. Q.E.D.
English (Elwes 1883)
Will is only a particular mode of thinking, like intellect; therefore (by Prop. xxviii.) no volition can exist, nor be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned by some cause other than itself, which cause is conditioned by a third cause, and so on to infinity. But if will be supposed infinite, it must also be conditioned to exist and act by God, not by virtue of his being substance absolutely infinite, but by virtue of his possessing an attribute which expresses the infinite and eternal essence of thought (by Prop. xxiii.). Thus, however it be conceived, whether as finite or infinite, it requires a cause by which it should be conditioned to exist and act. Thus (Def. vii.) it cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary or constrained cause. Q.E.D.
Coroll. I.--Hence it follows, first, that God does not act according to freedom of the will.
Coroll. II.--It follows, secondly, that will and intellect stand in the same relation to the nature of God as do motion, and rest, and absolutely all natural phenomena, which must be conditioned by God (Prop. xxix.) to exist and act in a particular manner. For will, like the rest, stands in need of a cause, by which it is conditioned to exist and act in a particular manner. And although, when will or intellect be granted, an infinite number of results may follow, yet God cannot on that account be said to act from freedom of the will, any more than the infinite number of results from motion and rest would justify us in saying that motion and rest act by free will. Wherefore will no more appertains to God than does anything else in nature, but stands in the same relation to him as motion, rest, and the like, which we have shown to follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and to be conditioned by it to exist and act in a particular manner.
Modern English
Will is only a certain mode of thinking, just as intellect is. So (E1P28) no single volition can exist or be determined to act unless it is determined by another cause, and that cause in turn by another, and so on to infinity. If will is supposed infinite, it must also be determined to exist and act by God, not insofar as God is absolutely infinite substance, but insofar as God has an attribute that expresses the infinite and eternal essence of thought (E1P23). However will is conceived, then, whether finite or infinite, it requires a cause by which it is determined to exist and act (E1D7), and so it cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary or coerced cause. Q.E.D.